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Abstract
What is the impact of a local negative demand shock on local labor markets? We exploit
the unique natural experiment provided by the drawdown of U.S. military forces in West
Germany after the end of the Cold War to investigate this question. We find persistent
negative effects of the reduction in the U.S. forces on private sector employment, with con-
siderable heterogeneity in terms of age and education groups, and sectors. In addition, the
U.S. forces reduction resulted in a rise in local unemployment, whereas migration patterns
and wages were not affected.
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1 Introduction
The impact of economic shocks on local labor markets is a subject of long-standing interest to
economists, policy makers and the general public alike. In particular, the nature and magnitude
of potential local consequences of economic shocks are important for the justification and design
of regional economic policies. In many countries, considerable resources have been devoted
to helping regions mitigate and overcome past adverse economic shocks or to attracting new
investment in the hope of positive local externalities. Despite this interest, empirical research
has had difficulty establishing the causal effects of local economic shocks.1
In this paper we identify the causal effect of a local economic shock by taking advantage
of a shock that induced large exogenous shifts in labor demand in several districts of four
states (Bundesländer) in West Germany, but not in others. Specifically, we exploit the district
variation in the stationing and withdrawal of U.S. military forces in Germany after German
reunification and the end of the Cold War to examine the consequences of regional economic
shocks on local private sector employment. In addition, we also investigate the impact of this
labor demand shock on wages, unemployment and migration.
The unique natural experiment setting of the event allows us to improve on limitations
that impaired previous studies analyzing the effect of regional economic shocks on local labor
markets.2 The U.S. forces were stationed in West Germany in the 1950 at strategic points
along two major defense lines; local economic considerations were not important in this decision
process. In addition, and in a similar fashion to the stationing decision, the withdrawal decisions
for the U.S. forces in Germany were made exclusively by U.S. military officials and were neither
subject nor responsive to any politicizing: the U.S. Department of Defense decided on the details
of the withdrawal process purely on strategic military grounds. Both of these facts alleviate
concerns regarding the validity of exogeneity assumptions.
The U.S. forces affected the German local economies through three main channels: firstly,
the bases demanded goods and services from German companies; secondly, the U.S. soldiers,
civilian employees and their dependents were consumers in the local economies; and thirdly, the
1See Moretti (2011) for a recent review.
2It also allows us to improve on limitations that previous studies on the effects of base closures faced. For
example, the Base Realignment and Closure Process (BRAC) in the U.S. and the realignment of the German
Army are both likely to be influenced by strong local or regional stakeholders lobbying to safeguard their bases
against closures.
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bases acted as employers of German civilian workers.
Although German civilian employees typically comprised a small fraction of local employment
(the median is less than 0.5 percent of local employment in districts with U.S. military presence
in 1989), many of the early studies were preoccupied with the fate of these German employees.3
This focus reflects in part the overriding public and political interest at the time and the fact
that the legal status of the local national employees was then unclear.4
We focus on effects that are mainly driven by changes in channels one and two: at the end
of the 1980s, there were about 250,000 U.S. servicemen stationed in Germany (see Figure 1).
Together with the U.S. civilians whom the bases employed and the family members they all
brought along, the total U.S. presence in West Germany amounted to nearly 600,000 persons in
1989 (see Figure 2). At the district level where the U.S. bases were located, the U.S. presence
was sometimes large; for the 86 districts with a U.S. presence retained in our baseline anal-
ysis, the mean of the U.S. force level in 1990 was 3,707, which represents 2.9 percent of the
district population.5,6 The U.S. forces consumed mainly local, non-traded goods and services
from German sources  with respect to traded goods and services, the U.S. bases were mostly
self-sufficient. Overall, the withdrawal process represented a large consumption shock to the
affected regions which translated into a negative shock to local labor demand.
The results indicate that the realignment of the U.S. forces did indeed have significant nega-
tive effects on local private sector employment in Germany. On average, our coefficient estimates
suggest that the complete withdrawal in a given district is associated with a 0.4-0.7 percent year-
by-year drop in the number of jobs in the local private sector. An analysis of the dynamic pattern
3See, for example, Blien et al. (1992), Blien (1993), and Gettmann (1993).
4See, for example, the official information requests by members of the German parliament (Deutscher Bun-
destag, 1990a,b,c, 1991a,b) and the report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1992) on the process of reducing
the local national workforce.
5See Table 1. U.S. military deployments abroad of comparable size have only recently been built up in
Afghanistan and Iraq, with the peak of the force levels totaling 42,500 (about 0.1 percent of the local national
population) in Afghanistan and 251,100 (about 0.8 percent) in Iraq in 2009 (for the force level data, see Belasco
(2009); the population data for the relative importance of the deployments has been sourced from the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (2011)). A new report for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (U.S. Congress,
2011) discusses whether Afghanistan might be infected by a "Dutch Disease", i.e. an overdependence of local
employment on foreign aid connected to the foreign troop presence that might vanish into thin air in the case
of a swift withdrawal. We do not argue that our estimates for the drawdown in Germany could be extrapolated
to these cases as the circumstances of the deployments, the level of development of the countries, and the base
structures and relationships with the local economy are vastly different.
6Bebermeyer and Thimann (1990) attempt to assess the aggregate economic importance of the US stationing
in West Germany using a cost-benefit balance sheet accounting approach. Combining various data sources from
1986 and 1987, they calculate an annual gross benefit of 14.8 billion German DM and a net benefit (subtracting
cost items that are largely borne by the German federal budget) of 12.5 billion DM, which is equal to 0.62 per
cent of the West German gross national product at the time.
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reveals that this adverse effect is persistent and does not fade away even several years after the
withdrawal shock first hits. In line with the specifics of the consumption shock on which we
are focusing, the employment effects are most pronounced for local goods and services sectors
that were prone to suffer most from the reduction of local purchasing power, and were primarily
borne by young and old, and by low- to medium-skilled workers. We also find evidence of a rise
in local unemployment, whereas we do not find effects along the migration margin or in terms
of local wages.
This study advances the literature on the consequences of economic shocks on local labor
markets. The traditional approach in the literature uses deviations in regional time series of
employment from national averages to investigate the consequences of economic shocks (for ex-
ample, Topel, 1986, Decressin and Fatas, 1995) and Blanchard et al. (1992) in part of their
analysis). Employment, however, is determined by both labor demand and supply forces, and
these studies are not able to identify the effects of these two factors separately. Another promi-
nent approach in this area of the literature is to identify local economic shocks by using national
changes in industry employment interacted with measures of local industrial composition (see,
for example, Bartik, 1991, Blanchard et al., 1992, Bound and Holzer, 2000, Moretti, 2010, and
Notowidigdo, 2011). While this instrument is likely to be exogenous to local labor supply, it is
not clear whether it captures shocks to local labor demand very well. It is possible, for example,
for a region to lose employment in an industry even though that industry is growing on the
national level.
Carrington (1996) was among the first studies to examine a specific shock, namely the
construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) between 1974 and 1977. He analyzes
how this construction project affected the Alaskan labor market and finds that the timing of
the evolution of aggregate monthly earnings and employment closely matched changes in TAPS-
related activities. Overall, however, the findings suggest that this major demand shock had only
short-term consequences for the Alaskan labor market.
Other studies involving specific shocks use variation in energy prices to analyze the impact
of labor demand shocks on local labor markets. Black et al. (2005a), for example, analyze the
impact of the coal boom and bust in the 1970s and 1980s on local labor markets and find positive
effects of the boom on local non-mining sector employment and earnings, in particular in non-
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mining sectors producing local goods.7 The coal bust led to negative effects that are smaller
than the positive effects during the boom.8 They also find that the regions affected by the coal
bust experienced considerable population losses, whereas population growth was barely affected
by the coal boom. Studies that identify shocks through price fluctuations in natural resources
such as coal or oil focus on price changes of input factors that are widely used throughout
the economy; it is unlikely that these price fluctuations only impact on the energy-extracting
industries and do not have repercussions on both non-energy-extracting industries within the
treatment regions and industries outside these regions, in particular as prices of different energy
resources are highly correlated.
A common feature of the analysis by Carrington (1996) and the studies focusing on energy
price fluctuations is that they analyze shocks to very isolated or mainly rural regions,9 and
some of the results might be explained by these idiosyncrasies (e.g. that population growth in
the resource-rich regions was not affected by the coal boom in Black et al., 2005a). None of
the districts in the four West German states under consideration are as rural or remote as the
regions of main interest in these earlier studies.10
Our analysis also differs from these earlier studies with respect to the time frame. In the
setting of all these studies, the economic actors should have been aware of the fact that the
shocks were not permanent. We focus instead on a permanent and irretrievable shock that
should have been perceived as such by the economic agents. In this respect, our study is similar
to Greenstone and Moretti (2003) and Greenstone et al. (2010), who study the regional industry-
level employment and productivy effects from the awarding of "Million Dollar Plants". While
their analysis provides an original identification design for regional spill-over effects by focussing
on the different evolutions in "winner" and "loser" counties in competitive biddings for large
industrial plants, an important limitation of their data is that it does not provide information on
the expected size of the plant, which is likely to be important for the magnitude of the potential
7For a similar analysis using Canadian data see Marchand (2011).
8In other papers, these authors investigate how the coal boom and bust affected other outcome variables such
as education or participation in disability programs (Black et al., 2002, 2003, 2005b).
9Alaska is obviously very remote; but Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, the states in which
treatment and control districts are located for the analysis by Black et al. (2005a), are also rural areas with
population density ranging from 30 - 110 inhabitants per square kilometer.
10Several studies consider other arguments as to why adjustments to economic shocks might play out differently;
factors discussed include relative skill supply, the enterprise ownership structure or the housing supply in the
affected regions. See, for example, Bound and Holzer (2000), Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), Kolko and Neumark
(2010), Notowidigdo (2011), and Larson (2011).
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spill-over effects into employment and welfare. The U.S. withdrawal process on which we focus
is a well-defined shock because the data at hand allow us to measure precisely the size and
structure of the shock for all treatment areas.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section provides a brief account of the historical
background of the stationing and withdrawal of the U.S. military forces in Germany. In Section
3 we present our estimation strategy, and Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 reports our
results, separately for regional employment, wages, unemployment and net migration, as well as
several robustness checks. Section 6 provides a conclusion.
2 Historical Background
2.1 U.S. Forces in Germany 1945-1990
After the end of World War II, the Allied Forces (American, British, French and Soviet) es-
tablished four occupation zones in Germany. Following negotiations that had already started
during the war in 1944 within the allied European Advisory Council (EAC) and that had been
agreed upon in principle at the Yalta conference, the final demarcations of the 4 zones were
confirmed by the Potsdam Agreement on August 2, 1945.
The American zone included a large part of the southwest area of Germany (which was later
to become the states of Bavaria, Hesse, and the northern part of Baden-Württemberg) plus the
seaport town of Bremerhaven on the North Sea and the American Sector in Berlin. In Article
12 of the "Berlin Declaration" issued on June 5, 1945, the Allied Powers granted themselves
the authority "to station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may
determine" (U.S. Department of State, 1985). However, there were initially no plans for a major
permanent military presence. With the burgeoning confrontation of the Cold War marked by
the establishment of two states on German soil in 1949, the Berlin blockade and airlift, and the
war in Korea, the Western Allied Powers established NATO (which the West German Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) joined in 1955) as a common defense organization and deterrent
against potential Soviet aggression. The NATO "Forward Strategy" foresaw the West German
area as the central battlefield where a potential Soviet invasion would have to be halted until
additional forces could be activated. Against the backdrop of this concept, the U.S. forces in
Germany established bases at strategic points along two major lines of defense, expanding their
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presence also beyond the early boundaries of the American zone.11
An estimated number of 1.9 million American soldiers were stationed on German soil at the
end of World War II.12 After the temporary reduction to less than 100,000 in the first years of
the occupation up to 1950, the strength of the U.S. forces was consolidated to around 250,000 in
the mid 1950s. Figure 1 tracks the historical evolution of the U.S. active military personnel in
Germany from 1950 to 2005. Apart from some temporary build-ups and reductions, for example
after the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises in the early 1960s and later due to the Vietnam War,
the level of the American military presence remained more or less stable until 1989, making
it one of the largest and longest peace-time deployments of an army in a foreign country in
modern history.13 The overall U.S. presence, including the employed civilian personnel and
dependents was even more significant, totaling more than 570,000 in the spring of 1989 (see
Figure 2). The U.S. forces in Germany maintained over 800 bases and installations, ranging
from small unmanned signal posts to training areas covering more than 20,000 hectares or
airbases that employed more than 12,000 personnel. The left part of Figure 3 illustrates the
regional distribution and the relative personnel size of the U.S. bases across Germany in 1990.
2.2 The Withdrawal and Realignment of U.S. Forces after 1990
The end of the Cold War created a turning point for the U.S. presence in Germany. In March
1989, the NATO countries and their counterparts from the Warsaw Pact began negotiations on
reductions of conventional armed forces in Europe. The fall of the Berlin wall on November 9,
1989 and the swift political transformations in several Eastern European states further sped up
the negotiations, and just one month after the formal reunification of Germany, the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty was signed in November 1990.
Several official U.S. government reports (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991a,b) and
the comprehensive study conducted in 1995 by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion
(BICC) (Cunningham and Klemmer, 1995) provide detailed insights into the planning and exe-
11Several large airbases were constructed, for example, in Rhineland-Palatinate in the former French occupation
zone west of the Rhine considered to be less vulnerable to a Soviet attack. For a brief account of the history
of U.S. forces in Germany, see for example Duke (1989), pp. 56-148. For details on the U.S. base planning in
Rhineland-Palatinate, see van Sweringen (1995).
12See Frederiksen (1953) and Trauschweizer (2006).
13The numbers in Figure 1 also reveal the distribution between the different branches of the U.S. armed forces,
with the Army constituting 70-85 percent, the Air Force 10-30 percent and the Navy and Marine Corps less than
1 percent of the total deployment at any point in time.
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cution of the U.S. drawdown process. In preparation for some of the structural changes that were
to materialize in the future, the European command of the U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR)
had formed a planning group as early as July 1988. Based on the troop ceilings established in
the CFE negotiations, the USAREUR command was quick to draw up a plan to reconfigure the
required force levels and identify units for withdrawal and bases and communities for closure.
The key criteria for the selection of sites by U.S. military officials were
(i) "ensuring that the forces would meet military and operational requirements;
(ii) decreasing support costs and increasing efficiency of base operations;
(iii) minimizing personnel moves;
(iv) reducing environmental impact; and
(iv) considering the proximity of training areas, the quality of housing and facilities, the local
political and military environment, the concerns of host nations, and the base's proximity
to road and rail networks."14
On September 18, 1990, the Pentagon publicly announced the closure and realignment of 110
sites in Germany, starting the first phase of the withdrawal.15 By 1996, another 20 rounds of
base closures in Germany would be gradually announced, bringing the number of U.S. military
personnel at the end of the 1996 fiscal year to a low point of around 85,000, a massive 75 percent
reduction compared to the 1989 level. Although the official documents and newspaper accounts
from the time mention some coordination between U.S. and German authorities, they also high-
light the fact that the local German politicians and communities were usually taken by surprise
and learned about the imminent closures only around the time of the public announcements by
the U.S. forces in the news media.16,17 The "drawdown shock" at the local level was further
14U.S. General Accounting Office (1991b), p.3.
15Earlier, U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney had already announced the closure of Zweibrücken air base in
Germany on January 29, 1990, as part of a round of mostly domestic base closures within the 1991 fiscal year
defense budget (Doke, 1990; Vynch, 1990).
16Cunningham and Klemmer (1995) describe how the US Department of Defense maintains complete author-
ity which has to a large extent de-politicized the foreign base closure process compared to the domestic BRAC
process. They report that even for Rhineland-Palatinate, where the state authorities specifically requested that
the United States close primarily installations in densely populated and highly industrialized urban areas (...),
but keep open the sites located in rural and underdeveloped areas of the state, these priorities were inconse-
quential due to the increasing pace of the withdrawal. They conclude as follows: In none of the cases reviewed
were the German civil authorities able to stop or reverse the US decision to withdraw. In some limited cases (...)
German officials were able to delay closure. Conversely, some high-level requests to delay closure were denied.
17We conducted an extensive newspaper archive search of both U.S./international and German newspapers
(including, but not limited to major titles such as Business Week, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal,
Der SPIEGEL, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), Handelsblatt as well as Stars
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exacerbated by the short time frame of 180 days that the U.S. forces envisaged between the
announcements and the completion of the withdrawals with the return of the vacated sites to
German authorities.
With the U.S. troop levels reaching new target levels of around 90,000 and new safety threats
emerging in Europe (for example in the Balkans after the dissolution of Yugoslavia), the pace
of the drawdown process slowed down considerably in the mid-1990s. Only after the terrorist
attacks of 2001 that resulted in a comprehensive redesign of U.S. security policy, including
changes in overseas basing, were new rounds of major U.S. base closures in Germany announced
and implemented. This process is still underway: in summer 2010, USAREUR announced a
major withdrawal by 2015 from the Heidelberg and Mannheim area, a former stronghold and
location of the headquarters of the U.S. Army in Germany.18
In summary, three features of the stationing and drawdown process deserve highlighting, as
they lay the foundation for the identification strategy in the empirical analysis. Firstly, both the
designation of the initial U.S. base locations after the occupation, but even more importantly,
the base closure and realignment decisions half a century later, were governed unequivocally
by American strategic military considerations. Secondly, local withdrawals of the U.S. forces
constituted abrupt socks with a surprise element for agents in the local economy. Thirdly, the
magnitude of the withdrawal process was large and exhibited strong variation in size and timing
at the local level.
3 Empirical Approach and Identification
We identify the causal effect of the U.S. withdrawal on local labor markets by estimating
difference-in-difference (DD) models, contrasting the evolution of employment and wages in dis-
tricts with a U.S. presence and subsequent withdrawal and a group of control districts. In our
simplest specification for employment, the empirical model estimated by OLS has the following
& Stripes, the major news outlet for the U.S. military community) for the years 1988 to 2009, either via the
news archives of the respective media and/or comprehensive databases such as Factiva and Genios. Based on
alternative search keywords such as U.S. Army, U.S. Forces, bases, closures, realignment and Germany,
the articles that we found in all cases relayed (if any) specific information about the locations, extent and timing
of drawdown decisions only after the fact, i.e. after the information had already been officially disclosed by
the U.S. Department of Defense and/or the U.S. forces in Germany. A bibliography of all the articles found is
available from the authors upon request.
18The latest piece of information in this respect appeared in the New York Times on January 12, 2012,
announcing that the U.S. will withdraw another brigade (about 4,000 soldiers) from Germany, as the new military
strategy focuses on the Asia-Pacific region and on sustaining a strong presence in the Middle East.
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form:
(1) logYkt = αk + δt + β × logU.S. Forceskt × 1 [t > Y ear0k]) + kt
The dependent variables are district-level measures of employment, denoted by Y , in district
k and year t. The parameter of interest, β, is the coefficient on the logarithm of the level of
U.S. forces in the given district k in year t, and an indicator function for the post-treatment
period that varies according to Y ear0k, the year of the first announcement of a U.S. withdrawal
in a given treatment district. All estimates include a vector of district dummies, αk, that
control for mean differences in employment across districts, and year dummies, δt, that adjust
for employment growth common to all districts. So β reflects the extent to which employment
growth in a district varies with the extent of the U.S. forces reduction.
In extensions to the specification of Equation 1, we estimate specifications that include
dummies for state-by-year, and linear or quadratic district-specific time trends in order to allow
for deviations from the common trend assumption. In the latter, the identification of the effects
of U.S. withdrawal comes from whether the withdrawal lead to deviations from preexisting
district-specific trends.19
For the analysis of the wage outcomes that vary at the individual level, we augment specifi-
cation (1) with covariates that control for individual characteristics:
(2) logWikt = αk + δt + β × logU.S. Forceskt × 1 [t > Y ear0k]) +Xiktγ + ikt,
where the subscript i denotes the individual observations. The vector of individual controls,
Xikt, includes a quartic in age and dummies for foreign citizenship, occupations, and industries.
In order to capture potentially heterogeneous treatment effects according to industry, we
perform both pooled estimations across all industries and separate estimations using industry-
district samples. Again, all models are estimated in extensions that include state-by-year dum-
19In our baseline estimations, we do not weight the district-year observations in any way for two reasons:
firstly, as the employment data is summarized from the full universe of establishments, there is no systematically
heteroscedastic measurement error that varies with the district size. Secondly, since we are interested in the
average "treatment" effect of the U.S. withdrawal in a district, there is no specific reason to place more weight
on large districts. See Autor (2003) who puts forward these arguments in his analysis of the effect of exceptions
to the common dismissal law on temporary help service employment growth in U.S. states. Moreover, if we do
weight the observations by district population, the results - as reported in one of the later robustness checks and
available in detail from the authors upon request - are virtually unchanged from the unweighted results.
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mies and linear or quadratic time trends.
In the recent applied econometrics literature, two potential problems for the consistent es-
timation and inference in DD models have received considerable attention. Firstly, Bertrand
et al. (2004) show that the inference based on the standard treatment of clustered errors can be
misleading in the presence of serial correlation. They demonstrate that next to more complex
approaches such as block bootstrap methods20, the bias in the standard errors can be reduced
to viable levels by clustering at the group level if the number of groups is sufficiently large for
asymptotic theory to hold. Secondly, following up on seminal contributions by Moulton (1986,
1990), Donald and Lang (2007) report that the standard methods for dealing with a DD model
that mixes individual and group-level data and where the regressor of interest varies only at the
group level also suffer from severely downward-biased standard errors in the presence of intra-
group correlations. In our context, we address these concerns by following the recommendations
by Angrist and Pischke (2009, chap. 8): in our baseline employment and wage estimations,
we use Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at the district level to allow for arbitrary
forms of correlation within districts and rely on the large number of districts and time periods
in our setting.21 For our wage estimations, where we face the Moulton problem, we further
confirm the robustness of our results by implementing a two-step estimation procedure as pro-
posed by Donald and Lang (2007) that first aggregates on the group level and then performs
the DD estimation on covariate-adjusted district averages.22 Finally, in some of our robustness
checks, we also show that our results are robust if we implement an alternative two-way cluster-
ing method recently suggested by Cameron et al. (2011) or cluster standard errors at the higher
aggregation level of labor market regions to allow for spatial autocorrelations across districts
within the same labor market region.
4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
We consider employment and wage outcomes from 1975 to 2002 for 202 districts (NUTS-3,
"Landkreise und kreisfreie Städte") that are located in the four German federal states of Hesse,
20See, for example, Fitzenberger (1998), Conley (1999).
21Although the minimum required number of clusters cannot be easily determined as it depends on the appli-
cation, Angrist and Pischke argue that the evidence from DD research on U.S. states suggests that more than 50
clusters should be sufficient. In our baseline setting, we use a total of 182 districts with 86 in the treatment and
96 in the control group.
22The results from these estimations are available upon request.
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Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Württemberg, and Bavaria. More than 95 percent of the U.S. Mil-
itary personnel was based in these states in 1990, that is before the beginning of the drawdown.
Our treatment variable is a measure of the annual level of U.S. forces in a given district.
The data on the regional level of U.S. forces are calculated from a newly constructed database
that combines official U.S. data on the number of assigned personnel at the individual base level
with the geocoded location of the base and the dates when realignment and closure decisions
were first announced. Details on the original U.S. military data sources and the construction
of the database are provided in the Data Appendix. Figure 3 illustrates the extent of the base
realignments between 1990 and 2002 across West Germany, while Table 1 shows the selection of
the districts and Figure 4 shows the distribution of the U.S. forces for the treatment districts
in 1990. The mean (standard deviation) of this variable is 3,707 (4,477), the median is 2,151
and the min (max) is 4 (20,087). Districts within the four southern federal states in which the
U.S. Military was never present constitute the control group. Figure 5 exhibits the geographical
distribution of the 86 treatment and 96 control districts in our baseline sample.
Data on our outcome variables of employment and wages for all districts in our sample is
based on the full universe of the social security records which are provided by the German
Institute for Employment Research (IAB). The individual employment spells, drawn from the
entire set of employment histories (Beschäftigten-Historik, BeH ), provide information on the
employees' characteristics (for example, age, nationality, and education) and with the use of an
employer identifier for each spell, are merged with firm-level information from the histories of es-
tablishments (Betriebs-Historik-Panel, BHP) that detail the industry affiliation, and workplace
location. Our outcome data is thus very similar to the variables contained in the IABS, a widely
used and well documented 2% subsample of the social security records that is publicly available
to researchers.23
The use of the full universe of the employment spells is crucial to our analysis. We expect
that the effects from the military drawdown primarily accrue to employees of small and medium-
sized companies that are active in local non-tradable industries. Using the IABS directly for the
analysis would therefore not be a suitable alternative, since employment spells from employees
in large firms and/or large industries are more likely to be included there.24
23See the latest IABS data documentation in Drews (2007).
24See Dustmann and Glitz (2008) for a similar argument in the context of firm-level responses to changes in
local labor supply. They report that for 1995, the share of large firms with more than 100 employees included in
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The data include all employment that is subject to social security contributions, but ex-
cludes the self-employed, civil servants, students enrolled in higher education, and the German
military. More importantly for the purpose of our analysis, the data do not contain information
on hours worked, and as part-time employment is only covered consistently from 1999 onwards,
we restrict our analysis to full-time employees. In the interest of abstracting from other poten-
tially confounding factors, we further limit our sample to prime age employment of employees
aged 25 to 55 and exclude employment in agriculture, mining, and sectors that are dominated
by government activities and public ownership. We also exclude German employees who are
employed by U.S. bases and other foreign forces.25
Information on individual education levels in the original BeH employment spells is improved
using the standard imputation algorithm developed for the IABS by Fitzenberger et al. (2006).
In line with similar previous studies, the education information is then separated into three
categories distinguished primarily according to vocational qualification: (1) low education for
people without any occupational training; (2) medium education for people who have either
completed an apprenticeship or graduated from a vocational college and (3) high education for
people who hold at least one degree from a technical college or a university.
Similarly, we distinguish and code for each employment spell, based on the employer infor-
mation, three categories of establishment sizes: (1) firms with up to 25 employees, (2) those
with more than 25 but less than 100 employees, and (3) those with 100 employees or more.
Our wage outcome variable is real gross daily wages. The wage information in the BeH
data has the advantage of being very accurate, as it stems from administrative records of the
employers. On the downside, wages are top-coded at the social security contribution threshold
(SSCT). The share of censored wages increases with education.26 We will show later that the
employment of highly educated employees is not affected by the withdrawal of the U.S. forces.
Therefore, we exclude them from most of the wage analyses. For all other employees we impute
and replace the right-censored wages using an imputation algorithm developed for the IABS
by Gartner (2005) and implemented in a similar fashion by numerous studies that use some
the IABS is almost 15%, while the true share over the whole population of firms in Germany is less than 2%.
25These are identifiable in the industry classification of the Federal Employment Agency of 1973 which we
use (the 3-digit code is 921, labeled Dienststellen der Stationierungsstreitkräfte, i.e. 'agencies of the stationed
forces'). See Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (1973) and Blien et al. (1992).
26In our full sample, for male (female) employees, the wage information is right-censored each year for up to
2.8% (0.8%) of the spells in the case of low education, 12.7% (1.9%) in the case of medium education, and 67.0%
(25.8%) in the case of high education.
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IAB dataset (for example, Dustmann et al. (2009) and studies cited in the review by Büttner
(2010)).27 Wages are deflated by the common consumer price index (base year: 2000) for West
Germany provided by the Federal Statistical Office.
We construct a panel of yearly cross-sections for each district at the reporting date of June
30 in each year. For the employment outcome that does not vary on the individual level,
we summarize the level of district employment into district-year observations; beyond total
employment, we also calculate the annual district employment level according to age, education
level, and industry groups in order to enable the separate analyses of heterogeneous effects. For
the analysis of wages that do vary at the individual level, we focus on male employees and draw a
10 percent random subsample of the individual employment spells for each district in each year.28
We merge district level information on population and area size from the German Federal and
State Statistical Offices with the data, and include information on two basic area types (districts
in urban areas versus rural areas), using a classification developed by Möller and Lehmer
(2010) for their analysis of the urban wage premium that builds upon the original classification
scheme by the German Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (BBR). Finally, we
separately identify all border districts that share a common border with any neighboring foreign
state.29
Table 2 presents summary statistics on several indicators for the treatment and control
districts in our baseline sample for the years 1990 and 2002. Columns (1) and (4) report the
means for the treatment districts and columns (2) and (5) report those for the control districts in
1990 and 2002 respectively. Columns (3) and (6) include the respective differences and indicate
the statistical significance from t-tests on the equality of means. The treatment districts in our
27Specifically, we first ran a series of tobit regressions of log wages separately for each year, gender and education
group with covariates that include a quartic in age and dummies for foreign citizenship, occupations, industries
and the local districts (the results from theses estimations are available upon request). The top-coded wage
observations were then replaced by draws from normal distributions that are truncated from below at the SSCT
and the moments of which are determined from the respective tobit estimations. Büttner and Rässler (2008) and
Büttner (2010) have recently criticized this homoscedastic single imputation as it may lead to biased variance
estimates and develop a Bayesian multiple imputation method allowing for heteroscedasticity (MI-Het), which
they can show to perform better in simulations with the IABS. Given the higher computational intensity of this
approach and the fact that we use a much larger dataset with the entirety of records for a long panel, we decided
to remain with the simpler method.
28As a single annual cross-section for all our districts consists of up to 8.4 million individual spells, working
with the full population panel was not feasible due to standard limits of memory size and computational speed.
29While we do include these districts in our baseline sample, we confirm our results by excluding them in some
of our later robustness checks, as these regions could potentially be influenced by workers who commute to the
other side of the border. Moreover, the districts that are located on the former border to East Germany or the
Eastern border to other former member states of the Warsaw Pact benefit from higher levels of regional subsidies
(for example, from the European Regional Development Fund) in response to their marginal location.
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sample have, on average, a higher population and are more densely populated. This is also
reflected in the figures of the third subpanel in Table 2: 33% of the treatment districts are
located in urban areas compared with 16% of the control districts. The bottom panel quantifies
the geographic distribution across the four federal states (see Figure 5). It suggests that the
spatial distribution is quite balanced, although within Hesse, the treatment districts outnumber
the control districts. In the entire sample, this is compensated for by a higher share of control
districts located in Bavaria.
In summary, the unconditional cross-sectional comparisons for the two selected years reveal
some differences between our treatment and control regions. The key identifying assumption in
the difference-in-difference framework that we employ only requires that the outcomes in the
treatment and control group follow similar time trends in the pre-treatment period (see Angrist
and Krueger, 1999, Angrist and Pischke, 2009, chap. 5). Cross-sectional differences only lead
to a violation of this assumption if they affect changes in the outcomes in a time-varying way.
As outlined in the previous section, we control for any source of potential misspecification by
including in all our regressions district and time-fixed effects, and also estimate specifications
that are enriched by state-by-year fixed effects and full sets of district-specific linear or quadratic
time trends. Finally, given the strong variation in the U.S. force numbers at the district level,
our identification relies as much on the comparison between the districts in the treatment group
as on the comparison with districts in the control group.
5 Results
5.1 Employment
A. Initial Estimates
Table 3 reports the results for our initial OLS regression of equation (1). Each column presents
three separate regressions of the log of total district private sector employment, with entries in
panel A reporting the results for the pooled employment outcome of all employees and Panel B
and C considering the outcome separately for male and female employment.
The regressions reported in the first column include only the measure of the U.S. withdrawal
treatment and district and year fixed effects on the right hand side of the equation. The estimated
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coefficient is negative and statistically significant, with the point estimate being larger for men
than for women, and being more precisely measured for males. The second column adds state-by-
year dummies for the four different federal states to the model in order to absorb state-specific
shocks, with the estimate for the overall employment being virtually unaltered, although the
point estimate for males drops slightly and that for females rises and is now significant.
Once we add the full set of 130 district-specific linear time trends to the model in column (3),
the precision of the estimates is increased considerably, with the size of the standard errors being
more than halved. The absolute value of the negative coefficient estimate drops to about 0.4 log
points, but remains highly significant. Replacing the linear by quadratic trends in column (4)
only slightly alters the results, and the negative point estimate on the U.S. forces level variable
remains highly significant despite the inclusion of almost 550 covariates. The hypothesis that
the state-year interactions or district-specific time trends are jointly zero is strongly rejected by
the data in standard F-tests. In these two final specifications, the effects are the same both in
magnitude and in terms of precision for the two genders.
The size of the coefficients in the last two specifications suggests that the elasticity of private
sector employment with respect to the reduction of U.S. Forces is -.004. This implies that a
reduction of U.S. forces by 100 persons leads to a loss of about 4.6 full-time private sector jobs.30
In the remainder of the paper, we always tabulate results for the latter two specifications
that include the district-specific linear or quadratic time trends and which provide in our view
robust and conservative estimates of the withdrawal effect. 31
B. Heterogeneity of effects
As argued in the introduction, the U.S. withdrawal shock constituted a consumption shock that
affected local labor demand because it was concentrated among locally produced, non-traded
goods and services. In this section, we test this notion by allowing for heterogeneity of effects
across different subsets of total district employment. We first partition local employment along
the industry margin.
Table 4 shows the results for specifications analogous to specification (1), estimated for
30The mean level of U.S. forces was about 3,700 in 1990, and the mean level of private sector employment in
treatment regions was about 42,300.
31We have also tested specifications that include a square or cubic function of our treatment variable, but these
specifications were rejected in favor of the simpler linear model.
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employment separated according to industry groups.32 Consistent with the nature of the shock,
the largest and most significant effects are found in the sectors of food and consumption goods,
and particularly private household services.
The top part of Table 5 provides estimates for our withdrawal coefficient for the district
employment in the three age groups (again subdivided in panels according to gender), with
odd-numbered columns reporting the specifications with linear, and even-numbered columns
the specifications with quadratic district time trends. The coefficient estimates suggest that the
adverse effect of the withdrawal mainly manifests itself in lower employment growth for younger
male and female and for older female workers, while the point estimates for the other groups are
smaller in absolute value and not significantly different from zero. Similarly, the bottom part of
the table reveals that it is primarily the employment of low and medium educated workers that
is affected, although surprisingly, we find the strongest effects of approximately -0.5 to -0.7 log
points for the employment of high-qualified female workers.
C. Dynamic pattern of effects
In the analysis thus far, we have employed the traditional DD setting that presumes discrete
changes in the treatment variable leading to instantaneous effects on the outcome of interest
 an assumption that is likely not to hold in our context: even if individual bases were closed
down swiftly after the announcement was made, the force reductions at the district level in
most cases took a couple of years to reach their full extent. The single coefficient on the
treatment variable would then fail to capture these longer-term effects. Similarly, although the
first base closure announcement for a district came as a surprise to the agents in the local
economy, as we have argued in section 2.2, employers in districts that were only affected late
in the withdrawal phase could still have responded by reducing their labor demand before the
first announcement for their district occurred if they expected cuts to reach their area at a
later stage. These anticipatory effects could lead the estimates of the single coefficient for the
withdrawal treatment to be biased towards zero. Since the timing of the withdrawal, measured
by the first announcement in a district, exhibits some variation across treatment districts, we
can identify and explore the dynamic pattern of the effect separately from the overall year
32We only tabulate the results here for the total employment (male and female) by industry since the estimates
do not vary systematically by gender. The more detailed results from the separate estimations are available upon
request.
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effects by augmenting the specification from equation (1) with lead and lag effects. We chose a
symmetric window that includes eight lead variables for the eight years before the first withdrawal
announcement occurred and eight lag variables for the years 0-7 and year 8 onwards, as our
selection of treatment and control districts allows us to have a balanced sample over this time
span.
Table 6 presents the results when we reestimate the effect on total district employment in the
augmented model using all four different specifications again regarding the combination of state
by year dummies and linear or quadratic time trends. In all four specifications, the coefficients
on the withdrawal announcement leads are hardly significantly different from zero, showing little
evidence of anticipatory employment responses. More importantly, the point estimates on the
withdrawal treatment delays continuously become more negative and significant, starting from
approximately -0.3 log points in year 2 after the withdrawal announcement up to -0.7 log points
after five to six years. Notably, the coefficient for the long term effect for year 8 onwards still
exhibits a negative effect that is at least in some specifications significantly different from zero.
This dynamic pattern is depicted for all four different specifications in figure 6.
The diffusion of the effect with stronger negative coefficients several years after the with-
drawal started in a district is in line with our expectation that the reduction in local demand
is only incorporated and adjusted for with some time delay. However, the persistence of the
negative steady state effect until at least 7 years after the start of the withdrawal might be
surprising if one rather expects the effect to fade off at some time. Given our sample period, the
results do not preclude that a mean reversion might occur in later periods, particularly, since we
do not incorporate in our empirical approach information on the size and timing of redevelop-
ment and conversion efforts in the treatment districts that could compensate for the reduction in
employment from the withdrawal of the U.S. forces. However, the available case study literature
suggests that apart from a small number of high-profile exceptions, the planning of local conver-
sion projects took several years before they even started to be implemented.33 In addition, even
if conversion projects were successful in promoting local economic development and employment
growth, this would lead our estimates to underestimate the true negative effects, and not the
other way around.
33See Cunningham and Klemmer (1995); Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) (1996). Brauer and
Marlin (1992) also provide a general overview of the specific challenges of conversion in the economics literature.
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D. Further Robustness Checks
We close our empirical analysis on the employment effects by describing some alternative checks
on the robustness of our results. While the augmented specification with lead and lag effects
from the previous section is probably the most appropriate and flexible one for ascertaining the
local effects from the U.S. withdrawals, we return here for ease of exposition to the simpler
specification from equation (1). Table 7 reproduces in row 1 the coefficient estimates for the
effect on total district employment from the top panel in column (7) and (8) of table 3 as a
baseline for comparison.
We first consider the robustness with respect to alternative definitions of our treatment
variable. Row 2 reports the estimates for a specification in which the treatment intensity is not
defined by the change in the total U.S. personnel level, but only by the change in the military
positions. The idea is that the civil employees could potentially have stayed in the respective
district and continued to consume in the local economy, living off income from alternative jobs
or unemployment benefits. The results are not affected by this change in the treatment variable.
The next specification examines whether the treatment effect differs for the withdrawal of U.S.
Army versus U.S. Air Force troops. Unfortunately, the Air Force withdrawals affect only 4
districts, so while the absolute value of the point estimates is comparable to the U.S. Army
estimates, the Air Force coefficient is no longer significant given the larger standard errors.
Another variation of our baseline specification uses the first actual base closure date instead of
the first announcement date as the identification of the start of the "post-treatment period".
Again, the coefficient estimates are virtually unaltered.
Next, we consider the robustness with respect to alternative sample definitions. Row 5
reports results where we only use the variation in treatment intensity within the group of our
treatment districts to identify the withdrawal effect. The point estimates remain almost identical
to the baseline. Similarly, the exclusion from the sample of very populous treatment districts
(given the structural differences in the population size between treatment and control districts
described in the summary statistics in section 4), of districts located in urban areas, of treatment
districts that saw only a partial reduction of the U.S. force level, or of Eastern or Western border
districts does not seem to affect the coefficient estimates.
In the specifications reported in Rows 11 to 13, we study the potential influence of three
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specific alternative district-specific shocks that could potentially bias our coefficient estimates.
The results in row 11 stem from a specification in which we include an additional covariate
(labeled U.S. Forces 1990 X FX) that interacts the log U.S. forces level in a given district
in 1990 (before the start of the drawdown) with the average annual U.S. dollar to German
DM exchange rate. This term is supposed to absorb the effects from the elasticity of the U.S.
demand active in the West German economy with respect to fluctuations of the exchange rate
that would have occurred even if the local force level had remained constant throughout our
sample period.34 By introducing a covariate that explicitly captures this effect, we rule out any
negative effects on the local economy that may have occurred already before and/or independent
of any reductions in U.S. force levels, and thereby reinforce our identification assumption. The
coefficient estimate on this term is highly significant (at least in the specification with quadratic
time trends) and has the expected positive sign (i.e. a devaluation of the U.S. dollar seems to
be associated with a drop in labor demand in the local economy). Reassuringly, our estimate of
the U.S. forces coefficient hardly differs from the baseline estimates.
During the time period of the U.S. withdrawal, the German Army and the French forces
(Forces Françaises en Allemagne) also implemented realignments of their bases as part of the
CFE treaty. Although smaller in absolute and relative size, these cuts more likely affected the
control districts in our sample, due to the spatial partitioning of the combined military presence
with the U.S. forces as NATO allies. Figure 8 depicts the regional presence by the German
armed forces as a share of the district population in 1991 and identifies the districts where
realignments took place between 1991 and 2002, while Figure 9 depicts the districts within the
four federal states that also hosted bases of the French forces.35 If we exclude these districts
subsequently from the treatment and control groups, the estimates in row 12 and 13 reveal that
the concurrent cuts by the German armed forces and the French forces do not seem to affect our
estimates of the U.S. withdrawal effect significantly.
As already summarized in our discussion of the empirical approach in section 3, the question
34Bebermeyer and Thimann (1990) note that the 50 percent decrease in the value of the US currency relative
to the D-mark from 3.30 in March 1985 to 1.65 in January 1988 has meant a corresponding cut in the purchasing
power of US servicemen stationed in the FRG. They document that this devaluation did not only lead to a
reduction of the private American demand active in the local economy at the time, but also incited the U.S.
bases to reduce their number of German direct employees and substitute some goods previously sourced from
West German suppliers with imports from U.S. companies. Figure 7 plots the time series of the exchange rate
for our sample years 1975 to 2002.
35For details on the respective data sources, see section C.3 and C.4 in the Data Appendix.
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of the correct calculation of standard errors and inference in DD settings has recently received
increasing scrutiny. In our baseline estimates, we have always reported robust standard errors
clustered on the district level that allow for arbitrary correlations within districts over time.
Row 14 of table 7 presents the results if we additionally weight the district-year observations
by the district population in order to account for potential heteroscedasticity of the error term.
The coefficient estimates are again only slightly reduced in their absolute value, and remain
highly significant. Next, we also used an alternative specification of the standard errors recently
proposed by Cameron et al. (2011). Their method aims to improve inference in situations with
non-nested multi-way clustering, and they specifically mention the case of state-year panels
where, in principle, it could be desirable to cluster both on the geographic unit (to allow for
serial autocorrelation) and year level to account for geographic-based spatial correlation. In the
case of two-way clustering, the estimator is calculated by adding up the variance matrices from
OLS regressions with errors clustered on the first and second dimension respectively, and then
subtracting the variance matrix from a regression with errors clustered on both dimensions. We
implement the estimator in our data, with the two dimensions being district and year. The
estimated coefficients reported in row 15 remain significant at the 5 and 10 percent level despite
the augmented standard errors. A further conservative alternative to account for potential
spatial correlation that could bias standard errors downwards is to cluster at higher regional
levels of aggregation. In this vein, Row 16 presents the coefficient estimates once we cluster the
errors on the levels of German labor market regions: reassuringly, the increase in the standard
errors is minuscule, so that the results do not differ from the baseline in a meaningful way.36
5.2 Wages
In our analysis thus far, we have documented that the withdrawal of U.S. forces did indeed
negatively affect employment in the German local labor markets where they were located. In
light of this evidence, we now address the question of whether the withdrawal also led to a
downward adjustment of local wages. As already described in sections 3 and 4, we base our
wage analyses on random subsamples of the individual employment spells from male employees
for each district and year in our sample period.
36We also repeated the whole empirical analysis at this higher aggregation level of labor market regions. The
coefficient estimates on the U.S. forces variable were negative and highly significant in all specifications, despite
the lower variation in the treatment variable and the smaller number of observations.
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Tables 8 to 10 present the results from DD estimations of equation 2 of real gross daily wages
(in logs), in breakdowns analogous to our employment analyses. All regressions include the full
set of available individual-level covariates (age, age2, dummies for foreign citizenship, education
levels, occupational groups) and the control variable for the exchange rate effect. The estimates
for the overall wage effect in Table 8 and separately according to age and education groups in
Table 9 are hardly significantly different from zero and suggest that local real wages did not
respond to the withdrawal shock. If anything, older and low qualified workers seem to enjoy
some relative wage increases in the affected districts, an effect that might stem from the primary
selection of younger workers to be dismissed. The analyses according to industries in Table 10
only reveal some evidence of potential downward wage adjustments for the sectors of "Food and
consumption goods" and "Transport/Information".
5.3 Impact on Unemployment and Migration
In this section, we use aggregate district-level data to examine the impact of the U.S. withdrawal
shock on unemployment and migration and provide further evidence of the relative importance
of the potential margins of adjustment in response to the withdrawal shock. The Statistics
Department of the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA) pub-
lishes a time series on district level data on the number of unemployed and the unemployment
rate starting in late 1984. Consistent with our timing convention for employment, we use the
so-called quarterly statistic reported for the month of June in each year. To analyze the migra-
tion response, we use aggregated data on net migration (the difference in the number of in-ward
migrants versus out-ward migrants) provided by the Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der
Länder (2011) and from complimentary data requests with the individual state statistical offices
to construct a consistent panel of district-year observations for the period 1985 to 2002.37
In table 11, we first report in panel A and B the results for the estimated impact on total
employment and wages for the comparable shorter time period from 1985-2002.38 The coefficient
estimates are consistent with our previous estimates for the longer time period from 1975-2002
37Unfortunately, more detailed migration data that reports the number of in-ward migrants and out-ward
migrants separately and in further splits by age groups, gender and citizenship is only available at the district
level from 1995 onwards.
38We focus here on the first three specifications with district and year FE only (1), the inclusion of state-by-year
effects (2) and linear district-specific time trends (3), as our results indicate that we cannot robustly estimate
the specification with quadratic district-specific trends in this shorter period in which the number of district
observations in the pre-period before the withdrawal starts is more than halved compared to the period before.
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(see tables 3 and 8), with significant negative effects for local private sector employment and
no adjustment in local wages. Panel C reports the coefficient estimates for an analogous DD
regression with the district unemployment rate as dependent variable. The results suggest that
the withdrawal of the U.S. forces increased unemployment.Panel D provides results from the DD
estimation on the net district migration share.39 The negative sign of the coefficient estimates
suggests a shift in the balance of migration towards greater out-ward migration in the treatment
districts after the withdrawal, but none of the estimates is statistically significant.
As argued previously for our employment outcome in section 5.1, the estimates for the year-
by-year effect could mask a richer pattern of dynamic adjustments, particularly if unemployment
and migration are only affected with some timedelay. In table 12, we hence present results from
analogous regressions of the dynamic pattern for all outcomes for the time period 1985 to 2002.40
Column (1) reports the coefficient estimates for the withdrawal leads and lags for employment.
Consistent with the previous results in table 6 for the "long" sample period, all lead coefficients
are statistically indistinguishable from zero, and the significant negative coefficient estimates
on the withdrawal delays in the post period reach their peak around 5 years after the first
withdrawal announcement. For real wages in column (2), the results confirm the absence of any
significant adjustment effects throughout the whole observation period.
The dynamic pattern of the coefficient estimates for the effect on unemployment and the
unemployment rate in columns (3) and (4) does indeed provide some suggestive evidence that
the decline in employment was (partially) absorbed by rising unemployment. Even if some lead
effects are also marginally significant, the pattern of the lagged effects provides a consistent
picture of continuously larger coefficient estimates up to a peak in years 5 to 6 after the initial
withdrawal shock. The coefficient estimates remain at this level even through the long term effect
for year 8 onward, but the lower precision and loss of significance for the estimates after year
7 prevent conclusive inference on the persistence of the rise in unemployment. Finally, column
5 shows the results for the comparable regressions for the net migration share. Again, the
coefficient estimates in the pre-withdrawal period are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The estimates on the lag effects all have a negative sign and are larger in absolute value. However,
39We define the net migration share by dividing the net migration balance in year t by the district population
in year t-1.
40For compactness, we focus here on the specification that includes linear time trends and a consistent time
period of between 5 years before and 8 or more years after the beginning of the withdrawal in a given district.
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only the coefficient estimate for year 3 after the withdrawal announcement is significant at the
5 percent level. In light of the data limitations outlined above, we interpret this as a qualitative
indication that some of the adjustment in response to the withdrawal shock could also occur via
increased out-ward or reduced in-ward migration in the affected regions.
Overall, our comparison of the estimated adjustment effects suggest that the withdrawal
shock primarily led to adjustments in quantities, and not in prices (i.e. wages). This finding is
consistent with Topel's (1986) result for the effect from a permanent local economic shock.
6 Conclusion
Empirical research has had difficulty in establishing the causal effects of local economic shock,
and one important reason for this issue is that the measurement of local economic shocks has
proven to be difficult. In this paper, we exploit the district variation in the stationing and
withdrawal of U.S. military forces in Germany after German reunification and the end of the Cold
War to examine the consequences of regional economic shocks on local labor market outcomes.
The unique natural experiment setting of the event allows us to improve on limitations that
impaired previous studies analyzing the effect of regional economic shocks on local labor markets.
The U.S. forces were stationed in West Germany in the 1950 at strategic points along two major
defense lines; local economic considerations were not important in this decision process. In
addition, and in a similar fashion to the stationing decision, the withdrawal decisions for the
U.S. forces in Germany were made exclusively by U.S. military officials and were neither subject
nor responsive to any politicizing: the U.S. Department of Defense decided on the details of the
withdrawal process purely on strategic military grounds. Both of these facts alleviate concerns
regarding the validity of exogeneity assumptions.
The results show that the withdrawal of the U.S. forces did have negative consequences for
private sector employment and for local unemployment. Wages and migration patterns, however,
were not affected.
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A Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics for selection of treatment districts
U.S. forces personnel according to district 1990
Number of Number of Total U.S. forces Share Mean Median Min Max
Regional selection districts bases (in 1990) of total abs. rel.⋆ abs. rel.⋆ abs. rel.⋆ abs. rel.⋆
Districts with U.S. installation(s) 872 360,091 100.0
in West Germany in 1990
Districts with assigned U.S. personnel in 130 486 360,091 100.0 2,770 2.2 988 0.4 0 0.0 20,087 21.4
West Germany in any year 1986-2009
Districts with assigned U.S. personnel 106 441 337,017 93.6 3,179 2.7 1,403 1.1 0 0.0 20,087 21.4
in HE, RP, BW, BY
of which
- Districts with U.S. personnel presence without 9 25 9,240 2.6 1,027 0.9 448 0.1 0 0.0 3,833 3.9
reduction/withdrawal announcement until 2002
- Districts with missing information 10 10 1,689 0.5 169 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 1,346 1.2
(withdrawal announcement, etc.)
- Outlier district 1 3 7,247 2 7,247 21.4 7,247 21.4 7,247 21.4 7,247 21.4
Kreis Zweibrücken (id=7320)
Treatment districts in baseline specification 86 403 318,841 88.5 3,707 2.9 2,151 1.4 4 0.0 20,087 17.8
of which
- Districts in Eastern border regions 6 16 10,397 2.9 1,733 1.4 1,396 1.3 5 0.0 3,869 4.0
with Czechoslovakia, former GDR
- Districts in border regions 10 36 27,599 7.7 2,760 3.0 1,370 0.8 4 0.0 11,740 12.8
with 'Western' countries, North or Baltic Sea
Notes: ⋆ Percentage measure relative to total district population  Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Austria
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Table 2: Selected district characteristics according to treatment status
1990 2002
Treatm. Contr. Diff. Treatm. Contr. Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Demographics
Population 184,497 124,736 59,761*** 195,965 136,325 59,641***
(17,768) (6,410) (18,889) (18,128) (7,109) (19,472)
Population density 625 346 279*** 648 366 282***
(inhabitants per sqkm) (83) (41) (93) (83) (42) (93)
Socio-economic outcomes
GDP per capita 23,573 22,000 1,574 28,960 27,136 1,824
(EUR) (1,004) (769) (1,265) (1,280) (1,002) (1,626)
Private sector employment 42,316 23,356 18,960*** 42,760 24,973 17,787***
(6431) (1580) (6623) (6226) (1681) (6449)
Ave. growth rate, 1975-1990 .011 .013 -.002
(.001) (.001) (.002)
Ave. growth rate, 1990-2002 .002 .005 -.003*
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Unemployment rate 5.5 5.1 0.4 7.7 7.0 0.7**
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3)
Net migration 3,326 2,350 976*** 878 697 181
(325) (131) (350) (102) (58) (117)
Area type
Urban .326 .156 .169*** .326 .156 .169***
(.051) (.037) (.063) (.051) (.037) (.063)
Geographic distribution
Hesse .221 .042 .179*** .221 .042 .179***
(.045) (.020) (.049) (.045) (.020) (.049)
Rhineland-Palatinate .198 .146 0.052 .198 .146 0.052
(.043) (.036) (.056) (.043) (.036) (.056)
Baden-Württemberg .209 .260 -0.051 .209 .260 -0.051
(.044) (.045) (.063) (.044) (.045) (.063)
Bavaria .372 .552 -.180** .372 .552 -.180**
(.052) (.051) (.073) (.052) (.051) (.073)
N 86 96 86 96
Notes: Due to data limitations, GDP per capita reported in 1990 column are 1992 values. * Significant
at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 3: Estimated impact of U.S. military withdrawal on
total district employment, 1975-2002
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment (log)
A. - All
log U.S. forces -.008*** -.007*** -.004*** -.004***
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.001)
R2 .987 .988 .998 .998
B. - Male
log U.S. forces -.009*** -.007*** -.004*** -.004***
(.002) (.003) (.001) (.001)
R2 .987 .988 .997 .998
B. - Female
log U.S. forces -.006 -.008*** -.004*** -.004***
(.003) (.003) (.001) (.001)
R2 .983 .984 .997 .998
Other covariates:
State by year dummies No Yes Yes Yes
District x time trends No No Yes Yes
District x time2 trends No No No Yes
N 5,096 5,096 5,096 5,096
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on the treatment variable for one
regression. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Robust
std. errors clustered at district level in parentheses. The F-statistics
[p-values] for the inclusion of the state by year dummies, linear and
quadratic time trends are, respectively: 7.144 [0.00], 745.2 [0.00] and
245.4 [0.00]. * Significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 4: Impact of U.S. military withdrawal on employment
according to industry
Dep. Variable: Employment (log) (1) (2)
by industry
1 Basic materials
log U.S. forces -.004 -.004*
(.003) (.002)
R2 .988 .992
2 Investment goods
log U.S. forces -.004* -.003*
(.002) (.002)
R2 .995 .997
3 Food and consumption goods
log U.S. forces -.003 -.004**
(.002) (.002)
R2 .991 .995
4 Construction
log U.S. forces -.004** -.002
(.002) (.001)
R2 .989 .993
5 Retail/Repair
log U.S. forces -.000 -.001
(.002) (.001)
R2 .995 .997
6 Transport/Information
log U.S. forces -.004 -.002
(.003) (.002)
R2 .985 .991
7 Corporate services
log U.S. forces -.002 -.003*
(.002) (.002)
R2 .994 .996
8 Private household services
log U.S. forces -.006*** -.005***
(.002) (.002)
R2 .994 .996
Other covariates:
State by year dummies Yes Yes
District x time trends Yes Yes
District x time2 trends No Yes
N 5,096 5,096
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on the treatment variable for one
regression. All regressions include district and year fixed effects and a
control variable for the exchange rate effect (see table 3). Robust std.
errors clustered at district level in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, **
at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 5: Impact of U.S. military withdrawal on employment according to age and edu-
cation groups
Dep. Variable: Employment (log) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
5-1 Results according to age group
A. - All
25-35 yrs. 35-45 yrs. 45-55 yrs.
log U.S. forces -.005*** -.004*** -.004** -.004*** -.001 -.002
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
R2 .995 .998 .995 .997 .996 .998
B. - Male
25-35 yrs. 35-45 yrs. 45-55 yrs.
log U.S. forces -.005*** -.004*** -.004** -.003*** -.001 -.001
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
R2 .995 .997 .995 .997 .996 .998
C. - Female
25-35 yrs. 35-45 yrs. 45-55 yrs.
log U.S. forces -.004** -.004*** -.004*** -.004*** -.002 -.003**
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.001)
R2 .994 .997 .995 .996 .994 .997
5-2 Results according to education group
A. - All
High Medium Low
log U.S. forces -.003 -.003 -.003*** -.003*** -.004*** -.004***
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
R2 .996 .997 .998 .998 .994 .996
B. - Male
High Medium Low
log U.S. forces -.003 -.003 -.004*** -.003*** -.004*** -.003***
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
R2 .995 .997 .997 .998 .991 .994
C. - Female
High Medium Low
log U.S. forces -.007*** -.005** -.003*** -.003*** -.004** -.005***
(.003) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001)
R2 .992 .994 .998 .999 .995 .997
Other covariates:
State by year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x time2 trends No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 5,096 5,096 5,096 5,096 5,096 5,096
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on the treatment variable for one regression. All regressions
include district and year fixed effects. Robust std. errors clustered at district level in parentheses. *
Significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 6: Dynamic pattern of impact of U.S. military withdrawal
on total employment at district level
Dep. variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total employment (log)
WD announcementt−8 .000 .000 .000 -.000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
WD announcementt−7 .000 .000 .001 .000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
WD announcementt−6 -.001 .000 .001 -.000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
WD announcementt−5 .001 .001 .001 .000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
WD announcementt−4 .001 .002 .001 .000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
WD announcementt−3 .001 .002 .001 .000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
WD announcementt−2 .001 .002 .001 .000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
WD announcementt−1 .001 .001 .001 .000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
WD announcementt0 -.000 .000 .000 -.001
(.001) (.002) (.001) (.001)
WD announcementt+1 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.002*
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.001)
WD announcementt+2 -.006*** -.003 -.002 -.003**
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.001)
WD announcementt+3 -.007*** -.005** -.004*** -.004***
(.003) (.003) (.002) (.001)
WD announcementt+4 -.009*** -.007** -.005*** -.005***
(.003) (.003) (.002) (.001)
WD announcementt+5 -.009*** -.008** -.006*** -.006***
(.003) (.003) (.002) (.002)
WD announcementt+6 -.009*** -.008** -.007*** -.005***
(.003) (.003) (.002) (.002)
WD announcementt+7 -.009*** -.008** -.006*** -.005**
(.003) (.003) (.002) (.002)
WD announcementt+8forward -.008** -.006 -.005* -.002
(.004) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Other covariates:
State by year dummies No Yes Yes Yes
District x time trends No No Yes Yes
District x time2 trends No No No Yes
R2 .987 .988 .998 .998
N 5,096 5,096 5,096 5,096
Notes: All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Robust std.
errors clustered at district level in parentheses. The WD announcement
dummies are defined relative to the year of the first announcement of the
U.S. withdrawal for a district, t = 0. * Significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at
1%.
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Table 7: Robustness analyses for impact of U.S. military withdrawal on total em-
ployment
Dep. Variable: Total employment (log) - All (1) (2)
1. Baseline Table 3-A. estimates -.004*** -.003***
N=5,096, N(treatment)=86, N(control)=96 (-.001) (-.001)
2. Restrict treatment intensity to reduction in U.S. military personnel -.004*** -.003***
(.001) (.001)
3. Separate treatment effect by "U.S. Army" vs "Air Force" personnel
U.S. WD treatment (%) - Army (N=84) -.004*** -.003***
(-.001) (-.001)
U.S. WD treatment (%) - Air Force (N=4) -.004 -.003
(-.003) (-.003)
4. Use 1st base closure date in district as start of "post" period -.005*** -.004***
(.001) (.001)
5. Include only treatment districts -.004*** -.003***
N=2,408, N(treatment)=86, N(control)=0 (-.001) (-.001)
6. Exclude treatment districts with pop. > most populous control district -.004*** -.004***
N=4,928, N(treatment)=80, N(control)=96 (.001) (.001)
7. Exclude districts in urban areas -.005*** -.005***
N=3,892, N(treatment)=58, N(control)=81 (.002) (.001)
8. Keep only treatment districts with complete closure by 1995 -.004** -.004***
N=3,192, N(treatment)=33, N(control)=81 (.002) (.002)
9. Exclude Eastern border districts -.003*** -.003***
N=4,648, N(treatment)=80, N(control)=86 (.001) (.001)
10. Exclude Western border districts -.005*** -.004***
N=3,120, N(treatment)=70, N(control)=60 (.001) (.001)
11. Include control variable for "US-FX" effect
log U.S. forces -.004*** -.003***
(.001) (.001)
log U.S. forces 1990 X FX .001 .002***
(.001) (.001)
12. Exclude districts with Bundeswehr reduction 1991-2001 -.004*** -.003***
N=4,060, N(treatment)=76, N(control)=69 (.001) (.001)
13. Exclude districts with French forces (FFA) reduction 1991-2001 -.004*** -.004***
N=4,620, N(treatment)=80, N(control)=85 (.001) (.001)
14. Weight by district population -.002*** -.002***
(.001) (.001)
15. Cameron-Gelbach-Miller two-way clustering -.004* -.003**
(.002) (.002)
16. Cluster standard errors by labor market region  -.004*** -.003***
(.001) (.001)
State by year dummies Yes Yes
District x time trends Yes Yes
District x time2 trends No Yes
Notes: All regressions include district and year fixed effects and a control variable for the exchange
rate effect (see table 3). Robust std. errors clustered at district level in parentheses. In this
specification, standard errors are clustered at the higher aggregation level of labor market regions. *
Significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 8: Estimated impact of U.S. military withdrawal on gross
daily wages, 1975-2002
Dep. variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Real wage (log)
log U.S. forces .001 .001** .000 .000
(.001) (.000) (.000) (.000)
R2 .387 .387 .388 .388
Other covariates:
State by year dummies No Yes Yes Yes
District x time trends No No Yes Yes
District x time2 trends No No No Yes
N 8,839,146 8,839,146 8,839,146 8,839,146
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on the treatment variable for one
regression. All regressions include district and year fixed effects and a con-
trol variable for the exchange rate effect (see table 3). Robust std. errors
clustered at district level in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** at 5%,
*** at 1%.
Table 9: Impact of U.S. military withdrawal on gross daily wages according to age and
education groups
Dep. Variable: Real wage (log) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
9-1 Results according to age group
25-35 yrs. 35-45 yrs. 45-55 yrs.
log U.S. forces -.000 -.000 .001 .001 .001** .001**
(.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
R2 .298 .298 .390 .390 .436 .436
N 3,448,330 3,448,330 2,962,646 2,962,646 2,428,170 2,428,170
9-2 Results according to education group
High Medium Low
log U.S. forces -.000 -.000 .000 .000 .001** .001**
(.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
R2 .400 .400 .372 .372 .342 .343
N 937,829 937,829 7,230,040 7,230,040 1,609,106 1,609,106
Other covariates:
State by year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x time2 trends No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 5,096 5,096 5,096 5,096 5,096 5,096
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on the treatment variable for one regression. All regressions include
district and year fixed effects and a control variable for the exchange rate effect (see table 3). Robust std.
errors clustered at district level in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 10: Impact of U.S. military withdrawal on gross
daily wages according to industry
Dep. Variable: Real wage (log) (1) (2)
according to industry
1 Basic materials
log U.S. forces -.000 -.001
(.001) (.001)
R2 .497 .497
N 974,206 974,206
2 Investment goods
log U.S. forces .000 .001**
(.000) (.000)
R2 .498 .498
N 2,681,760 2,681,760
3 Food and consumption goods
log U.S. forces -.000 -.00002*
(.000) (.000)
R2 .366 .366
N 1,136,738 1,136,738
4 Construction
log U.S. forces .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
R2 .327 .327
N 1,243,583 1,243,583
5 Retail/Repair
log U.S. forces -.000 .000
(.000) (.000)
R2 .287 .287
N 1,095,586 1,095,586
6 Transport/Information
log U.S. forces .0002* -.0003***
(.000) (.000)
R2 .242 .242
N 634,314 634,314
7 Corporate services
log U.S. forces -.001 -.001
(.001) (.001)
R2 .387 .387
N 802,316 802,316
8 Private household services
log U.S. forces -.000 .000
(.001) (.001)
R2 .424 .424
N 270,643 270,643
Individual level covariates Yes Yes
Other covariates:
State by year dummies Yes Yes
District x time trends Yes Yes
District x time2 trends No Yes
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Table 11: Estimated impact of U.S. military with-
drawal on employment, wages, unemployment, net
migration, 1985-2002
Dep. Variable (1) (2) (3)
A. Total employment (log)
log U.S. forces -.006*** -.005*** -.003***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
B. Real wage (log)
log U.S. forces .000 .000 -.000
(.000) (.000) (.000)
C. Unemployment rate
log U.S. forces .063** .063** .058***
(.028) (.028) (.022)
D. Net migration share
log U.S. forces -.003 -.008 -.015
(.008) (.007) (.011)
Other covariates:
State by year dummies No Yes Yes
District x time trends No No Yes
District x time2 trends No No No
N 3,276 3,276 3,276
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Table 12: Dynamic pattern of adjustment effects, 1985-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variable Total empl. Real wage Unempl. Unempl. Net migr.
(log) (log) (log) rate share
WD announcementt−5 .000 -.000 -.003 -.031** .002
(.001) (.000) (.002) (.016) (.010)
WD announcementt−4 -.000 -.000 .001 -.004 .000
(.001) (.000) (.003) (.016) (.013)
WD announcementt−3 -.000 .000 .003 .014 .008
(.001) (.000) (.003) (.015) (.014)
WD announcementt−2 .000 .000 .005* .021 .007
(.001) (.000) (.003) (.016) (.014)
WD announcementt−1 .000 .000 .005* 0.031* -.020
(.001) (.000) (.003) (.018) (.012)
WD announcementt0 -.001 .000 .004 .019 -.011
(.001) (.000) (.003) (.018) (.014)
WD announcementt+1 -.002** .000 .006* .037* -.001
(.001) (.000) (.003) (.021) (.013)
WD announcementt+2 -.002** .000 .008** .065** -.018
(.001) (.000) (.004) (.029) (.019)
WD announcementt+3 -.003*** .000 .009* .090** -.043**
(.001) (.000) (.005) (.036) (.021)
WD announcementt+4 -.004*** -.000 .010** .120*** -.038
(.001) (.001) (.005) (.040) (.026)
WD announcementt+5 -.005*** -.000 .011* .133*** -.034
(.001) (.001) (.005) (.041) (.023)
WD announcementt+6 -.004*** -.000 .010* .132*** -.027
(.001) (.001) (.006) (.047) (.024)
WD announcementt+7 -.003** -.000 .009 .119** -.032
(.001) (.001) (.007) (.055) (.026)
WD announcementt+8m -0.000 .001 .010 .079 -.013
(.002) (.001) (.008) (.071) (.032)
Other covariates:
State by year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .999 .376 .984 .948 .716
N 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276 3,276
Notes: All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Robust std. errors clustered
at district level in parentheses. The WD announcement dummies are defined relative to
the year of the first announcement of the U.S. withdrawal for a district, t = 0. * Significant
at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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B Figures
Figure 1
Figure 2
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Figure 3: U.S. Military Bases in Germany, 1990 and 2002
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Figure 4
Figure 5: Treatment and control districts in baseline sample
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Figure 6: Dynamic pattern of impact of U.S. military withdrawal on total employment at
district level
Notes: See text and table 6 for details. Vertical bands represent ± 1.96 times the standard error of each point
estimate.
Figure 7: Average yearly USD/DM exchange rate
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Figure 8:
A.(top) - Presence of German Armed forces (Bundeswehr) as share of district population, 1991
B. (bottom) - Districts with cuts in level of German Armed forces, 1991-2002
46
Figure 9: Districts with French force (FFA) bases
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C Data Appendix
C.1 Data on U.S. Military forces in Germany
In the paper, we use data from a newly compiled database on the presence of U.S. military
forces in Germany. As the primary original source, we drawn on administrative records from
the U.S. Department of Defense, the so-called "U.S. Base Structure Reports" (U.S. Department
of Defense, 1988-2009). Section 115 of title 10, U.S. Code, stipulates that as part of the annual
budget process, the U.S. Secretary of Defense is required to submit an annual report to Congress
that details the base structure both in the U.S. and abroad. Over the course of the recent decades,
the exact reporting requirement as well as the format in which the U.S. Department of Defense
fulfills this requirement has been subject to some modifications. However, starting with the
report for the 1990 fiscal year, several editions of the report identify each individual U.S. base
and installation in Germany and provide (in addition to information on the type of military
use and the total acreage) manpower numbers of the assigned active duty military personnel.
While for the purpose of our analysis, our dataset would ideally comprise manpower observations
at the base-year level for the entire period under consideration (1975-2002), we primarily use
the data from the 1990, 1992 and 2002 fiscal year editions.41 In addition, we include data for
1995 that was directly gathered from the U.S. forces in Germany by Cunningham and Klemmer
(1995) for their descriptive report of the ongoing base realignment process, and that is provided
in a format compatible to the earlier official reports. Since the genuine purpose of the Base
Structure Reports (as with most other data from administrative or private sources) was not to
provide a consistent cross-section or time series for an econometric analysis, there are at least
three limitations of the data that we will now briefly discuss in turn.
Firstly, the manpower data in the reports provides figures for the authorized number of per-
sonnel for the subsequent U.S. fiscal year from which actual force levels could deviate. However,
comparing authorized versus actual figures reveals that deviations are small in the aggregate.
While this does not exclude larger deviations at the micro level of individual bases, we do not
have any evidence that these deviations differ systematically, for example according to military
branch or base size, and thus introduce a type of measurement error that could bias the results
towards finding a spurious effect.42
Secondly, the manpower data in the Base Structure Reports is compiled separately for the
U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and the U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) in Germany and in-
cludes a breakdown according to military, civilian and other personnel which includes employees
of full-time contractors working on the base and the local German nationals directly employed
by the base. In our primary analysis, we combine the three categories into one total measure
of the U.S. personnel numbers on the regional level. This definition disregards the fact that the
various groups have different pay scales and are likely to spend different amounts of their income
41For 1999 and 2001, the only other years for which a report containing information at the base level is available,
the data exhibit some obvious omissions of large, active bases in Germany that are likely due to a switch from a
manual to an automatic data gathering process by the U.S. Department of Defense.
42In fact, the usual attenuation bias would rather work against finding an effect significantly different from
zero.
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in the local economy.43
Thirdly, the regional distribution of the U.S. personnel in the data could be subject to some
minor measurement error as the strength levels are sometimes rolled up by parent unit(U.S.
Department of Defense, FY1999, p.4). Starting with the report for the 1999 fiscal year, the U.S.
Department of Defense also reported data for individual overseas bases only if the site has more
than 10 acres OR a plant replacement value exceeding one million dollars. (ibid, p.3). The 2002
edition of the report (which we use for the construction of our primary withdrawal treatment
indicator) lists 47 such smaller Army sites and 26 Air Force sites. While these numbers do not
seem negligible, the combined authorized personnel at these sites constituted less than 0.7% of
the total force level44, so our estimation results are unlikely to be affected in any important way.
In a related aspect, earlier attempts to quantify the regional U.S. presence in Germany were
also hindered by the fact that manpower data were often aggregated at the military community
or garrison level that could stretch large regions across several districts or in some cases even
beyond federal state boundaries with the inclusion of so-called remote sites. Our data allow us
to overcome this shortcoming: the information on the exact name of the base and the nearest city
from the Base Structure Reports enables us to augment the original base information with its
exact address and geographic position, using information from internet directories that include
historic maps and satellite photos (from Elkins, nd). We can thus attribute the manpower data
with great precision and confidence to the districts in which the respective sites are located.
C.2 Data on Timing of U.S. Base Realignments
Our empirical approach requires an accurate identification of when the withdrawal begins at the
district level. As outlined in the paper, we date the start of the post-treatment period at the
district level as the first reporting date after the first base closure was announced for a given
district. The announcement dates at the base level were collected and verified drawing on three
different data sources:
(1) An official list compiled by the History Office of the U.S. Army Europe that details which
closure rounds affected which site and specifies the projected or actual closure dates
(USAREUR History Office, nd);
(2) A collection of official news releases issued by the U.S. Department of Defense which
allowed us to match the closure round numbers to exact calendar dates;
43Based on information requested at the U.S. Army and Air Force Headquarters in Germany, Bebermeyer and
Thimann (1990) detail that in 1987, air force personnel in Germany earned on average 80% more than their U.S.
Army counterparts which they ascribe to (a) the substantially higher proportion of officers and higher-ranking
soldiers within USAFE, and (b) the higher average income of each USAFE rank as a result of the greater length
of service and the many supplementary payments, that is, for hazardous work or weekend and night shifts. (Ibid,
pp. 104-105) In addition, USAFE service members are more likely to live off base and, due to their seniority,
have on average more dependent family members, which further increases the share of their income which they
spend in the local economy compared to the U.S. Army personnel.
44The comparison with earlier editions shows that many of these sites are likely to be small radio or radar sites
and small storage compounds, some of which are also located outside the four federal states on which we focus
our analysis.
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(3) A complete scan of historical newspaper accounts from the Stars & Stripes, the official
news outlet of the U.S. Department of Defense, around the dates when drawdown an-
nouncements were supposed to have taken place based on the two previous data sources.
The available data allowed us to identify and confirm all but one public announcement date
of all the U.S. base realignments occurring in Germany.45
C.3 Data on Base Realignments by the German Armed forces (Bundeswehr)
As we explain in the body of the article, other economic shocks operating at the district-year
level across the four states would violate our identification of the effect of the U.S. withdrawal.
We therefore gather data on the regional base realignments implemented by the German armed
forces over the time period 1991-2002 in order to check the robustness of our estimation results
once we exclude districts where U.S. reductions coincide with German base realignment. The
data on the German Armed forces is compiled from two different data sources:
(1) Luber (1991) includes an appendix of comprehensive data from three official reports by the
German Federal Ministry of Defense in 1991 on the existing force levels and the planned
reductions in the following years at the level of local postal codes
(2) In 1995, the German Federal Ministry of Defense published an updated plan for the re-
alignment of the German armed forces (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 1995).
The data from both sources are combined to identify all districts in the four states in our study
where reductions by the German armed forces took place between 1991 and 2002.46
C.4 Data on Base Realignments by French forces in Germany
(Forces Françaises en Allemagne, FFA)
Similar to the U.S. and German army base realignments, we also obtained data on the location
and closure of bases that were used by the French forces in Germany. The data on the French
forces is compiled from three complimentary data sources:
(1) The early offficial account by the German government (Deutscher Bundestag, 1991b) lists
68 bases used by the FFA, hosting an aggregate force of 44,200 up to the start of the
withdrawal and realignment in the early 1990s.
45The only exception where the exact calendar date could not be ascertained is the Base Closure Round 21 that
occurred sometime between the previous round, dated August 1, 1995, and the subsequent round, dated February
13, 1997. However, Round 21 affected only 5 sites, of which 2 were located in Bremerhaven and thus are not in
our estimation sample. For the other 3 sites located in the medium to large cities of Darmstadt, Frankfurt and
Fürth, this announcement round was not the first to affect the respective district, thus not altering our empirical
analysis for these districts.
46The German Ministry of Defense enacted further rounds of realignments in 2001 and 2004 (Bundesministerium
der Verteidigung, 2001a,b, 2004). We do not include these realignments in our analysis as they were implemented
after the end of our sample period.
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(2) Guth (1991) provides some data on the regional breakdown of the French troop levels,
clustered according to major garrison city. She puts the total number of French soldiers
stationed in Germany at 52,000 in 1987 and estimates that another 30,000 civilian workers
supported the French troop presence.
(3) A dedicated entry on Wikipedia (2011) provides a comprehensive list of all (active and
closed) foreign military bases in Germany that was used to validate the information ob-
tained from sources (1) and (2).
As data on the exact local French force levels according to base and their development over
time was not available, we restricted our attention to identifying the 17 districts in Rhineland-
Palatinate and Baden-Württemberg where the French forces maintained a presence according to
any of the sources (1)-(3) and excluded them from our estimation sample in one of the robustness
checks in order to document the fact that their inclusion did not bias our estimation results.
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